



Antimicrobial Resistance and Nosocomial Pathogens in Canada

May 30th, 2023

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Conflicts of Interest

- None

Overview

- Antimicrobial Resistance and Nosocomial Infections (ARNI)
- AMR Surveillance
- Genomics
- New AMR Surveillance Initiatives

ARNI Reference Services

- Confirmatory testing (phenotypic and genotypic)
 - Identification of rare or novel resistance mechanisms
 - Testing for new antimicrobials
 - Passive surveillance
- Outbreak investigation support
 - WGS for hospital outbreaks
 - Advice to hospital/provincial/federal epidemiologists and microbiologists
 - Support to other countries
- Proficiency Testing and Standards

ARNI Basic and Applied Research

- Characterization of novel resistance mechanisms
- Development of assays to rapidly identify and type pathogens from specimens
- Whole genome sequencing to better understand transmission routes
- Genetic mechanisms of epidemic strains
 - Genomic and proteomic studies

ARNI Surveillance

- Canadian Nosocomial Infection Surveillance Program (CNISP)
- Canadian Integrated Program for Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance (CIPARS)
- AMRNet
- Carbapenemase-Producing Organisms CPHLN
- CANWARD
- *Neisseria gonorrhoeae*
- *Streptococcus*
- Wastewater

PHAC AMR Priority Organisms 2020

- Methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus*
- Vancomycin-resistant *Enterococcus*
- Carbapenemase-producing Enterobacterales
- *Clostridioides difficile*
- *Neisseria gonorrhoeae*
- *Mycobacterium tuberculosis* (different NML Lab, Hafid Soulahine)
- *Streptococcus pneumoniae*
- *Streptococcus pyogenes*
- Typhoidal and non-typhoidal *Salmonella enterica*
- *Acinetobacter* species
- *Campylobacter* species
- *Escherichia coli*

<https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/publications/drugs-health-products/canadian-antimicrobial-resistance-surveillance-system-2020-report.html>

Overview

- Life in the Antimicrobial Resistance and Nosocomial Infections Unit (ARNI)
- **AMR Surveillance**
- Genomics
- New AMR Surveillance Initiatives

Canadian Nosocomial Infection Surveillance Program (CNISP)

CNISP is a collaboration between the


- ❑ Public Health Agency of Canada ([PHAC](#)) including the National Microbiology lab ([NML](#))
- ❑ Association of Medical Microbiology and Infectious Disease ([AMMI](#)) Canada
- ❑ [Sentinel hospitals](#) across Canada

In 2022, CNISP has expanded to include **88 hospitals in 10 provinces and 1 territory** including rural, community and northern hospitals

In 2023, potential expansion to 110 hospitals

Overview of CNISP

Participating CNISP sites in 2009
Proportion of acute care beds (27%)



Current CNISP Surveillance Projects

- ***Clostridioides difficile* infection (CDI)**
 - Cerebrospinal fluid shunt SSI
- **Methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA) bloodstream infection (BSI)**
 - Pediatric Cardiac SSI
- Methicillin-susceptible *Staphylococcus aureus* (MSSA) BSI
- ***Candida auris***
- **Vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) BSI**
 - Carbapenemase-producing organisms (CPO)
- Central Line-Associated Bloodstream Infections (CLABSI)
 - Antimicrobial Use
- Hip and knee Surgical Site Infections (SSI)
 - Antibigram
- Point prevalence surveys
 - Viral Respiratory Infections (VRI) - COVID-19

CNISP surveillance of *Clostridioides difficile* infection (CDI)



https://www.cdc.gov/hai/organisms/cdiff/cdiff_infect.html

- 2004-2005 Pilot study
- HCA-CDI surveillance since 2007
- CA-CDI since 2015

- Stool samples submitted
March+April for adult (year round
for Peds)

- Primary *C. difficile* isolation
- AST (Etest)
- Toxin PCR
- Ribotyping (replaced PFGE 2018)

- Moving into WGS 2022



Clostridioides difficile infection (CDI)

Community-associated CDI



Range: 1.57-1.83 per 10,000 PD

Healthcare-associated CDI




24%

CDI attributable mortality




Range: 1.2%-2.6%

Inpatient healthcare-associated (HA) & community-associated (CA) CDI rates




CDI attributable mortality






Changing Molecular Epidemiology of *C. difficile* 2007-2021







Declining Fluoroquinolone Resistant Strain Types and Emerging Susceptible Types




CNISP: Antibiotics with the greatest absolute decreases

- Stewardship highlight for *C. difficile* NAP1

Rate of AMU per 1,000 patient days/
Taux d'AMU pour 1 000 jours-patients




Vancomycin Resistant Enterococci (VRE) bloodstream infection (BSI)



CDC/Dan Higgins - Medical Illustrator, 2013

- Surveillance of infections and colonizations since 1999
- Surveillance of only BSI beginning 2018
- AST sensititre
- Van PCR
- WGS (all to be sequenced)



Vancomycin Resistant Enterococci (VRE) bloodstream infection (BSI)

Healthcare-associated VRE




83%

VRE all-cause mortality





Range: 28%-37%

Inpatient healthcare-associated (HA) VRE rates




VRE all-cause mortality






Distribution of VRE Sequence Type by Year, 2017-2021




AMMI/CACMID 2023 P033 McCracken et al.




Vancomycin Resistant Enterococci (VRE) bloodstream infection (BSI)

Increasing Antimicrobial Resistance Trends in VRE



CNISP Surveillance of MRSA bloodstream infection (BSI)



NIAID <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.2003775.g002>

- Surveillance since 1995
 - Previously included colonization and other infections
 - Currently just BSI (2018 on)
- Surveillance year round
- AST (Sensititre)
- rtPCR (mec, nuc, PVL)
- Spa typing (2008+)
- PFGE
- Moving into WGS 2022



Methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA) bloodstream infection (BSI)

Community-associated MRSA



69.4%

Healthcare-associated MRSA




Range: 0.43-0.50 per 10,000 PD

MRSA all-cause mortality





Range: 16.2%-18.8%

Inpatient healthcare-associated (HA) & community-associated (CA) MRSA rates





MRSA all-cause mortality







National Distribution of Select Canadian MRSA Epidemic Strains from Bacteremia Cases (CNISP, 1995-2021)







Trends in MRSA AMR





MRSA CLD Resistance and Usage



CNISP surveillance of Carbapenemase-producing *Enterobacterales* (CPE)




Stephanie Rossow, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/Antibiotic Resistance Coordination & Strategy Unit

- Surveillance of CPE infections and colonizations since 2010
- Select Environmental
- WGS
- AST Sensititre



CPE infection and colonization rates, 2010-2021

Rate per 10,000 patient days
Taux pour 10,000 jours patients




No. infections	11	14	12	19	22	17	20	21	36	50	36	53
No. colonizations	6	37	27	24	24	37	89	119	148	223	193	222



CNISP CPE Surveillance

Figure 4 CPE infection rates by acquisition, CNISP, 2014-2021



32% (96/300) reported international **travel** in the 12 months prior to positive culture



27% (80/294) received **healthcare while abroad**, most commonly in South Asia (46%, 33/71)



24% of inpatients (67/285) were in an **intensive care unit** at the time of positive culture or were admitted following positive culture

17%


30-day all-cause mortality

AMMI/CACMID 2023, P036 R. Mitchell et al.;
P042 L. Matasje et al.




CPE

Total Carbapenemase Producing Enterobacteriales 2010-2021




All Carbapenemases Reported 2010-2021






Distribution of Organisms 2010-2021



- Similar to some Provincial reports there is a decline in *E.coli*



CPE in Canada: CPHLN Data. L. Mataseje



Total number	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
	4	4	63	128	117	148	204	389	764	906	1234	1474	1243	1470	2117

Year



CIPARS: Carbapenemase Surveillance

Drs. Amrita Bharat and Audrey Charlebois

- Only Canadian human case S. London OXA-48, NB, travel history to Morocco (2018)
- Only Canadian animal case S. London IMP-64 clinical pig isolates MB (2016)

Imported Seafood 2,584 samples screened 10 CPE identified (2011-15)

Gene Description	Speciation	n	Origin of sample (n)	Sample Types
<i>bla</i> _{NMC}	<i>Enterobacter cloacae</i>	2	Vietnam (2);	CIPARS retail shrimp n=832
	<i>Enterobacter aerogenes</i>	1	Bangladesh (1)	
<i>bla</i> _{VCC}	<i>Vibrio cholerae</i>	2	India (2)	
				Niche market seafood
<i>bla</i> _{NDM} , <i>bla</i> _{TEM} , <i>bla</i> _{OXA-1}	<i>Enterobacter cloacae</i>	2	Vietnam (2)	Clams n=101
<i>bla</i> _{NMC}	<i>Enterobacter cloacae</i>	3	Vietnam (3)	

Janecko et al., 2016 Emerg Infect Dis 22:1675-77



Mangat et al., 2016 AAC 60:1819-25

Candida auris – Dr. Amrita Bharat



Potentially deadly fungus spreading rapidly in US health care facilities

Cases of Candida auris doubled in 2021, according to a new CDC report.



An emerging fungal threat spread at an alarming rate in US health care facilities, study says


By Janelle Chavez, CNN
Published 5:01 PM EDT, Mon March 20, 2023



CTV News
June 11, 2021 · 🌐

Doctors are warning about the emerging threat of Candida auris, a deadly fungal infection that resists treatment and tends to thrive in hospital settings and long-term care facilities.

Number of *C. auris* cases in Canada, 2012-2022



Schwartz and Hammond. Can Commun Dis Rep. 2017; 43:150–153.

Rapid Response to MDR *C. auris* in Canada

CANWARD Mycology Surveillance
Drs. Jeff Fuller and George Zhanel
Ended 2016



2017 Canadian Nosocomial Infection Surveillance Program (CNISP) *C. auris* Interest Group

Co-led by Allison McGeer, Amrita Bharat, Robyn Mitchell

- ~45 participating hospitals




2017 Canadian Public Health Laboratory Network (CPHLN) Mycology Working Group

Co-led by Philippe Dufresne and Amrita Bharat

Linda Hoang, BC Centres for Disease Control, BC
Tanis Dingle, Alberta Health Services, AB
Kathy Malejczyk, Saskatchewan Shared Health, SK
David Alexander, Cadham Provincial Laboratory, MB
Julianne Kus, Public Health Ontario, ON

Caroline Sheitoyan-Pesant, Centre Hospitalier
Universitaire Dr Georges-L.-Dumont, NB
David Haldane, QEII Health Science Centre, NS
Lei Jiao, Eastern Health, NL
Greg German, Health PEI, PEI


Genomic Clades of *C. auris*



D. DeLuca et al. 2022. Medical Mycology. 60:myab079. doi: 10.1093/mmy/myab079

Antifungal resistance was associated with clades I and III

C. auris in Canada, 2012-2022 (n=43)



~ one-third of isolates each were resistant to


- 0 classes (susceptible)
- 1 class (azoles)
- 2 classes (azoles and Amphotericin B) MDR

- All MDR isolates were in clade I


Overview

- Life in the Antimicrobial Resistance and Nosocomial Infections Unit (ARNI)
- AMR Surveillance
- **Genomics**
- New AMR Surveillance Initiatives

The Transition to Whole Genome Sequencing





WGS vs traditional spa typing for MRSA



This tree is made up of the first 100 MRSA CMRSA10 t008's identified in 2021. SNV differences ranged from 1-352.

Emergence of VRE ST1478



Evidence of both intrahospital and regional interhospital spread.

Kleinman DR et al. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol. 2023 Jan;44(1):17-23.

ARNI Genomics

- Isolates being sequenced and/or analysed at ARNI for surveillance:
 - All human *Salmonella* isolates sequenced by PulseNet Canada and Enteric Disease Program
 - Most *Salmonella* food and animal isolates
 - All CNISP VRE (1999-present) and MRSA (2018-present) blood isolates, *C. difficile* (on-going), and all CNISP CPE and CPA (2010 onward)
 - All *N. gonorrhoeae* being sequenced (Nov 2022 onward)
 - All *S. pneumoniae* and Group A Strep (Nov 2022 onward)
 - All *C. auris* sequenced
- Also sequencing all outbreak isolates submitted to ARNI
- Vision is to sequence all isolates submitted to ARNI Lab
- Incorporating machine learning into our bioinformatics tools (AMR prediction and surveillance/outbreak analysis)

Genomics AMR Prediction

- Predicting AMR for surveillance:
 - Salmonella harmonized with NARMS USA Program
 - *S. pneumoniae*
 - *N. gonorrhoeae*
 - Build safeguards to detect new resistance mechanisms

- Studies for predicting AMR
 - *Escherichia coli* (SIR validation)
 - Campylobacter (SIR validation)
 - *Pseudomonas aeruginosa*
 - *Enterococcus* spp.
 - MRSA

Genomics Clinical Diagnostics



Contents lists available at [ScienceDirect](https://www.sciencedirect.com)

Genomics

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ygeno



Identification of bacterial and fungal pathogens directly from clinical blood cultures using whole genome sequencing

S.W. Peterson^a, W. Demczuk^a, I. Martin^a, H. Adam^b, A. Bharat^{a,*}, M.R. Mulvey^{a,1}

^a National Microbiology Laboratory, Public Health Agency of Canada, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada


^b Diagnostic Services, Shared Health Manitoba, Health Sciences Centre, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada

J Antimicrob Chemother
doi:10.1093/jac/dkx067

Journal of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy


WGS to predict antibiotic MICs for *Neisseria gonorrhoeae*

David W. Eyre^{1-3*}, Dilrini De Silva¹⁻³, Kevin Cole^{4,5}, Joanna Peters^{4,5}, Michelle J. Cole⁶, Yanatan H. Grad^{7,8}, Walter Demczuk⁹, Irene Martin⁹, Michael R. Mulvey⁹, Derrick W. Crook^{1-3,5}, A. Sarah Walker¹⁻³, Tim E. A. Peto¹⁻³ and John Paul^{2,4,5}




Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy®

MECHANISMS OF RESISTANCE




Equations To Predict Antimicrobial MICs in *Neisseria gonorrhoeae* Using Molecular Antimicrobial Resistance Determinants

Walter Demczuk,^a Irene Martin,^a Pam Sawatzky,^a Vanessa Allen,^b Brigitte Lefebvre,^c Linda Hoang,^d Prenilla Naidu,^e Jessica Minion,^f Paul VanCaeseele,^g David Haldane,^h David W. Eyre,^{i,j,k} Michael R. Mulvey^a



Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy®

MECHANISMS OF RESISTANCE



Linear Regression Equations To Predict β -Lactam, Macrolide, Lincosamide, and Fluoroquinolone MICs from Molecular Antimicrobial Resistance Determinants in *Streptococcus pneumoniae*

● Walter Demczuk,^a Irene Martin,^a Averil Griffith,^a Brigitte Lefebvre,^b Allison McGeer,^c Gregory J. Tyrrell,^d ● George G. Zhanel,^e ● Julianne V. Kus,^{f,g} Linda Hoang,^h Jessica Minion,ⁱ Paul Van Caeseele,^j Rita Raafat Gad,^k David Haldane,^l George Zahariadis,^m Kristen Mead,ⁿ Laura Steven,^o Lori Strudwick,^p Michael R. Mulvey^a



ARNI Nosocomial Outbreak Reports

GENOME SEQUENCING REPORT

KPC outbreak analysis for the Montreal General Hospital

Report generated on 2023-02-07

SUMMARY

- 13/13 isolates harbour a plasmid containing *bla_{KPC}* within the Tn4401 transposon (Table 1). Among these isolates, four distinct plasmid clusters were identified. See Figure 6 for the predicted transmission schematic.
- The first plasmid cluster encodes *bla_{KPC-3}* on a 75 kb plasmid with a unknown replication type (Figure 4). There is evidence of clonal transmission between *Enterobacter cloacae* isolates (2-5 SNVs) with a novel ST and evidence of plasmid transmission between multiple *E. cloacae* STs and *Citrobacter freundii* ST100.
- The second plasmid cluster encodes *bla_{KPC-3}* on an IncN plasmid (Figure 5). There is evidence of clonal transmission among *E. cloacae* ST97 (1 SNV). Although the plasmids are similar, the Tn4401 transposon variants are not the same between *E. cloacae* ST97, *E. cloacae* ST177, and *K. oxytoca* ST108. Further epidemiological data is recommended to confirm the link between *E. cloacae* ST97, ST100, and *K. oxytoca*.
- The third plasmid cluster encodes two copies of *bla_{KPC-2}* on an IncP plasmid which is found in two *C. freundii* ST22 isolates (7 SNVs), indicating likely clonal transmission.
- The fourth plasmid cluster is an IncN plasmid in *C. freundii* ST22, which differs by 430-433 SNVs from the other *C. freundii* ST22. This IncN plasmid is unrelated to the IncN plasmids in cluster002.
- All plasmids group within known Canadian plasmid clusters.

SAMPLE DETAILS


Table 1: Line list of queried isolates

NRHP	Organism	Date of positive culture	Sequence type	QPO gene	ST401 variant	Plasmid type*	Size (kb)	Plasmid cluster
31A21CP0001	<i>Enterobacter cloacae</i>	17-Sep-2021	novel	KPC-3	31A2101-3	unknown/ST	74.2	001
31A21CP0007	<i>Enterobacter cloacae</i>	27-Sep-2021	novel	KPC-3	31A2101-3	unknown/ST	74.2	001
31A21CP0004	<i>Enterobacter cloacae</i>	14-Sep-2021	novel	KPC-3	31A2101-3	unknown/ST	74.2	001
31A22CP0006	<i>Enterobacter cloacae</i>	9-Sep-2022	novel	KPC-3	31A2101-3	unknown/ST	74.2	001
31A22CP0008	<i>Enterobacter cloacae</i>	14-Sep-2022	novel	KPC-3	31A2101-3	unknown/ST	74.2	001
31A22CP0007	<i>Citrobacter freundii</i>	7-Sep-2022	novel	KPC-3	31A2101-3	unknown/ST	74.8	001
31A22CP0001	<i>Enterobacter cloacae</i>	12-Sep-2022	novel	KPC-3	31A2101-3	unknown/ST	74.2	001
31A22CP0007	<i>Enterobacter cloacae</i>	27-Sep-2022	novel	KPC-3	31A2101-3	unknown/ST	74.2	001
31A22CP0002	<i>Enterobacter cloacae</i>	18-Sep-2022	novel	KPC-3	31A2101-3	unknown/ST	74.2	001
31A22CP0003	<i>Enterobacter cloacae</i>	18-Sep-2022	novel	KPC-3	31A2101-3	unknown/ST	74.2	001

GENOME SEQUENCING REPORT

ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE GENES

Figure 1: Resistance genes detected in genome sequencing data




GENOME SEQUENCING REPORT

PHYLOGENETIC CLUSTERING ANALYSIS

The overall tree was constructed using reference genome ID0006. Three clusters were identified and all environmental isolates clustered together. The closest clinical cluster to the environmental cluster was ID0003 at a distance of 19 SNVs, however cluster was 20 SNVs.

Figure 2: Maximum likelihood Tree (PhyML) based on SNVs from a multi-sequence alignment. Isolate ID0006 is the reference genome.



PLASMID PANGENOMES

Plasmid coding sequence content was compared within each plasmid cluster by creating a pangenome plot of all genes found within each plasmid. Core genes are present within each plasmid whereas variable accessory genes present only in select isolates will be indicated by gaps.

The pangenome of the *bla_{KPC-3}*-encoding plasmids in cluster001 are shown in Figure 4. Plasmid CDs are identical except for two IS3 family transposons from 10.7 kb - 12.1 kb in 31A22CP0022.

The pangenome of the *bla_{KPC-3}*-encoding IncN plasmids in cluster002 are shown in Figure 5. Plasmid CDs are identical except for a 10 kb island from 27.5 - 38 kb containing duplicates of *folP*, *emrE*, *pspF*, and *yghA* found in 31A22CP0002 and 31A22CP0017.


Figure 4: Plasmid pangenome analysis for *bla_{KPC-3}*-encoding 75 kb plasmids with unclassified replication type in cluster001



GENOME SEQUENCING REPORT

PREDICTED TRANSMISSION

Figure 6: Predicted transmission of *bla_{KPC}*-encoding plasmids among isolates from 2021 - 2022. All isolate numbers are represented by the last 3 digits and SNV distances are only shown between isolates with the same sequence type.



Collaboration with Dr. Hoang BCCDC


Overview

- Life in the Antimicrobial Resistance and Nosocomial Infections Unit (ARNI)
- AMR Surveillance
- Genomics
- **New AMR Surveillance Initiatives**


AMR Net

Drs. Wallace Rudnick, Shamir Mukai, and Michael Mulvey

- PHAC-funded lab-based AMR surveillance program under development
- Collaboration between PHAC, provincial/territorial public health, and human/animal labs
- Captures existing information on antimicrobial susceptibility testing from human clinical and veterinary labs
- Includes all bacterial and fungal organisms
- One-health, integrated approach




Where we are now....



Overview of Canada's Antimicrobial Resistance Network (AMRNet): A data-driven One Health approach to antimicrobial resistance surveillance
Rudnick et al. 2022 48:522-28

In the next year....



3 additional provinces/territories

National data on interactive website

Summary reports for stakeholders

Integration of pilot vet data

WHO GLASS submission

Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing Summary

PHAC AMRNet
08 March, 2023

E. coli


Please note that duplicates have been removed for all analyses presented here. Between 2016 and 2021, data on 10,000 *E. coli* isolates were submitted and included in the analysis below.

De-duplication method: Only the 1st *E. coli* isolate from a given patient in a given calendar year is included.

The percent of isolates tested represents the percent of isolates in a category with any susceptibility testing results that have been tested for the specific antimicrobial or combination. AMRNet does not collect information on isolates that do not undergo susceptibility testing.

Number of isolates by FSA Urine (all) Urine (inpatient and Outpatient) Blood All source

The map below show the number of isolates included in the analyses in 2021 by FSA. Please note that number of submitted isolates change year to year and differ between specimen types and FSAs.



Pseudomonas

Please note that duplicates have been removed for all analyses presented here. Between 2016 and 2021, data on 10,000 *Pseudomonas* isolates were submitted and included.

De-duplication method: Only the 1st *Pseudomonas* isolate from a given patient in a given calendar year is included.

The percent of isolates tested represents the percent of isolates in a category with any susceptibility testing results that have been tested for the specific antimicrobial or combination. AMRNet does not collect information on isolates that do not undergo susceptibility testing.

Number of isolates by FSA Urine Blood Respiratory Wound Non-blood All source



Summary reports for stakeholders



WHO GLASS submission



Integration of pilot vet data



The percent of isolates tested represents the percent of isolates in a category with any susceptibility testing results that have been tested for the specific antimicrobial or combination. AMRNet does not collect information on isolates that do not undergo susceptibility testing.

Number of isolates by FSA Urine (all) Urine (inpatient and Outpatient) Blood All source


The heatmap below includes *E. coli* from urine 2016 to 2021. Isolates from FSAs outside of PEI have been excluded. White text on the heatmap indicates fewer than 30 isolates represented.



FSA	Amoxiclav					Amoxiclav						
	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020		
PEI Fake	88	88	87	77	76	83	100	100	100	90	43	46
Charlottetown (CIABCE)	88	87	85	54	54	39	100	100	100	26	15	13
Summerside (C1N)	91	88	87	91	91	94	100	100	100	94	93	93
Prince County exci. Summerside (COB)	91	88	89	89	91	92	100	100	100	92	90	93
Queen & Kings exci. Charlottetown (COA)	87	88	89	60	40	49	100	100	100	30	19	19
PEI Fake	94	94	95	94	95	95	100	100	100	43	34	40
Charlottetown (CIABCE)	93	92	94	86	100	100	99	100	99	16	2	2
Summerside (C1N)	95	95	96	95	94	94	100	100	100	94	93	94
Prince County exci. Summerside (COB)	95	96	95	95	96	95	100	100	100	91	88	92
Queen & Kings exci. Charlottetown (COA)	94	93	94	56	92	100	100	99	100	19	8	10
PEI Fake	93	95	96	97	97	96	100	100	100	100	100	100
Charlottetown (CIABCE)	93	95	96	96	97	96	83	100	99	100	100	99
Summerside (C1N)	95	94	97	98	97	98	36	39	36	100	100	100
Prince County exci. Summerside (COB)	92	94	94	97	96	97	39	43	37	100	100	100
Queen & Kings exci. Charlottetown (COA)	93	96	95	97	96	95	62	95	101	100	100	93

Summary

- Early days
- Stable long-term funding
- Very positive responses and early support at FTP level
- Pilot: SES factors collaboration with StatCan and SK
- Data sharing/requests:
 - Human: WHO GLASS, PHAC programs (CARSS, CNISP), Non-profit
 - Vet: CIPARS, industry-affiliated network
- AMRNet Vet pilots with ON, SK & PEI
- Federal data: *C. difficile* (CNISP), *N. gonorrhoeae* (ESAG), *Salmonella* (CIPARS) data transfer approved




The “One-Health” AMR Model



<http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/owoh-umus/index-eng.php>


The 'Confusogram'




J. F. Prescott *et al.* (2000) Antimicrobial Therapy in Veterinary Medicine

Genomics Research Development Initiative (GRDI)

- 5 year funded interdepartmental shared priority project on AMR
- PHAC, AAFC, CFIA, DFO, ECCC
- 6 work packages to assess the dissemination of priority AMR pathogens affecting human and animal health across the farm to fork to clinic continuum



GRDI AMR2 CNISP Contributions



Wastewater AMR: Dr. Chand Mangat

- New surveillance program for AMR in wastewater
 - Community-based surveillance is a gap in our current complement of tests
 - Near-term technical goals
 - Develop a robust/stable method for tracking AMR genes, pathogens and plasmids (2 year)
 - qPCR panel to begin and transitioning to omics
- Development plan
- qPCR -> metagenomics -> quantitative metagenomics - > long-read
- 20 sites to be tested for weekly
 - Technically aligned with developing US-CDC program
 - US-CDC qPCR panel is below, will choose 8 indicators
 - mcr-1, vanA, NDM, KPC, VIM, CTX-M (group 1), CMY-2, TEM, SHV, int11, tetW, IMP

Establishment of a Phage Biobank at NML

- Alternatives to antimicrobial therapy
- Funding requested to establish a new lab to identify phage active against highly drug resistant AMR pathogens
- Phage therapy recently being approved for treatment of difficult to treat infections (compassionate use)
 - USA first case 2018
 - Canada first case 2022
 - Other countries ahead of Canada and USA
 - Clinical trials underway
- Why NML? Perfect location.
 - AMR pathogen collection for over 30 years
 - Wastewater collections and manure samples for isolation of phage
- Working with AMMI Canada Phage WG
- More info to come

Acknowledgements

- The ARNI Team
- Canadian Nosocomial Infection Surveillance Program
- Canadian Integrated Program for Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance
- CANWARD
- The Canadian Public Health Laboratory Network
- Canadian Animal Health Laboratory Network
- All of the many clinical laboratories interested in working with ARNI